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ABSTRACT 
Across the social sciences, agency theory has become one of the basic frameworks through 
which to analyze the organizational problem of aligning interests between owners (principals) 
and those who carry out the work of the corporation (agents). Less often analyzed within this 
framework is the problem of multiple principals with different incentives and agendas. In today’s 
global economy, this is a problem that institutional investors from around the world encounter on 
a regular basis. We argue that ownership concentration holds the key to dealing with the 
collective action problems that emerge in these circumstances. To provide empirical insight into 
these issues, we analyze the impact of ownership concentration in multiple-principal firms that 
have been listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the last decade. Through 
these data, we show that the strongest factor shaping performance among this population of firms 
is ownership concentration: the higher a firm’s ownership concentration, the better it performs, 
both in terms of profitability and in terms of efficiency. Further, as markets in this context have 
become more competitive over the last decade, overall profitability has declined, but the effect of 
ownership concentration has increased, suggesting that ownership concentration becomes even 
more important for achieving corporate goals as markets become more competitive.  
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Organizational theorists across the social sciences have long been interested in the relationships 
among ownership and organizational governance. One of the key problems guiding this field of 
research centers on the issue of how owners align their interests with the agents who carry out 
the goals of the organization. This is a problem that has deep theoretical roots dating back to the 
work of both Adam Smith and Max Weber and far-reaching implications across a variety of 
different settings and disciplines (Petersen 1993; Kiser 1999; Shapiro 2005). Many scholars have 
dealt with the principal-agent problem in political settings as diverse as the international 
operations of non-governmental organizations (Neilson and Tierney 2003), regulatory agencies 
in the United States (Weingast 1984; Wood 1988), and the bureaucratic tensions surrounding tax 
collection in early modern Prussia (Kiser and Schneider 1995). The issue has also held interest 
for those studying corporate governance in the fields of law, economics, and, more recently, 
sociology on the ways in which the agency problem fundamentally shapes corporate function, 
profitability, and efficiency. As one sociologist puts it, “The ability of a top management team to 
assure control over its organization is a fundamental concern for both corporate managers and for 
the field of organization studies” (Davis 1991, p. 583).  
 Where much of agency theory has focused on the problem of alignment of the interests of 
principals and their agents, the issue of multiple principals with diverse goals has posed 
problems for scholarship in this area (Kiser 1999; Shapiro 2005). The field has recognized the 
issue of multiple principals (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston 1985, 1986; Braverman and Stiglitz 
1986; Wood 1988), but few studies have considered the issue with regard to corporations and 
few have proposed mechanisms for how the problem of multiple principals is overcome. Adams’ 
(1996) examination of the problems that the Dutch and English governments faced in monitoring 
their colonial agents abroad, the Dutch and English East India Companies respectively, is an 
exception here. She both recognizes the problem of multiple principals in the corporate setting—
the “Hydra Factor,” as she calls it—and proposes the mechanism for how principals overcame 
the problem: networks. In this paper, we are concerned with the multiple-principal problem in a 
setting that is much more contemporary and common but where, as in Adams’ case, the political 
runs up against the economic—what happens to the principal-agent dilemma when state agencies 
are owners alongside private institutional investors, particularly when these owners have very 
different types of goals and agendas? Where Bernheim and Whinston (1985) argue that the 
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problem of multiple principals does not apply to the corporate setting, we argue that it does and 
that it is a phenomenon that is occurring with increasing frequency in the publicly-traded markets 
across transforming economies. But the problem of principals with diverse agendas is not 
confined to transforming economies; it is also a problem that advanced capitalist economies are 
facing with increasing frequency. For example, when institutional investors as diverse as those 
focused on shareholder value and those focused on “socially responsible” agendas sit alongside 
each other as principals of a given publicly-traded firm, the question of how to navigate the 
diversity of principals’ interests becomes as important as aligning the interests of principals and 
agents.  
 How do principals deal with this problem? The mechanism for dealing with the problem, 
we argue, lies in ownership concentration: owners may have diverse goals, and there may be 
many paths to profitability, but the key to seizing one of these paths and to ensuring that agents 
will achieve these goals is to gain a larger share of control and monitor the agents closely in 
carrying out the interests of the key principal(s). Ownership concentration is perhaps a simpler 
mechanism than the social structural solutions Adams uncovered in the Dutch and English East 
India Companies’ struggles with multiple principals, but it is equally powerful in its 
consequences. In this paper, we show that the most important factor in profitability and 
efficiency for publicly-traded firms in China’s domestic economy is ownership concentration: 
the higher a firm’s ownership concentration, the better it performs, both in terms of overall 
profitability and in terms of efficiency. We show this to be true even controlling for dominant 
ownership type, suggesting that although there might be different goals and agendas among 
different types of owners, principals can overcome the collective action dilemma of aligning 
interests among principals by concentrating ownership and directing firms toward the markets 
and methods that serve their interests best. We also show these effects to be stronger as markets 
become more competitive.  
 In the following pages, we begin by discussing the theoretical issues associated with the 
governance of publicly-traded firms, focusing on the principal-agent framework and the problem 
of multiple principals. The economic reforms in China provide the context in which we examine 
these theoretical questions. This context has several particularities associated with it, but the 
issues have much broader application, particularly in today’s global economy. Along with our 
introduction of the China case and a discussion of the ways in which this case is a fitting 
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framework within which to examine this theoretical problem, we introduce formal hypotheses, 
which we then test through an analysis of data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
We conclude with a discussion of the results in light of these theoretical issues. 
 
AGENCY THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS 
For social scientists, the issue of organizational governance and control has been a subject of 
discussion for centuries, and the issue of the (potentially) divergent interests and incentives of 
owners (principals) and those who carry out the work of the organization (agents) has been a 
central part of that discussion. Recent overviews of the theoretical developments of agency 
theory across the fields of economics, political science, and sociology leaves little doubt about 
the richness and complexity this theoretical body of work has taken on over the course of the last 
century (see, esp. Kiser 1999; Shapiro 2005).1 Because this theoretical field is significant and 
there have been many summaries of the literature, it is not the purpose of this paper to undertake 
an extensive review of the agency literature. We limit our discussion here to the multiple 
principal problem.  
In the field of economics, many famous scholars have examined the firm through the lens 
of the principal-agent problem, including such luminaries as Stephen Ross (1973), Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling (1976), and Joseph Stiglitz (1987), to name only a few. These 
scholars and those that followed them have been interested in one of the central issues of the 
firm—how principals can choose and monitor agents to most effectively carry out the goals of 
the principal. Issues of information asymmetries between principals and agents and the 
unevenness of the agents’ abilities have been key issues that have made their way into economic 
models of the principal-agent problem in the theory of the firm. A thorny problem that is often 
ignored in the economics literature, however, is that of multiple principals (Kiser 1999). In 
reviewing this literature, Shapiro (2005, p. 278) addresses this gap, writing, “The real problem is 
                                                 
1 With the exception of Shapiro (2005), the legal field is often left out of social scientific discussions of agency 
theory. This is unfortunate, because this field has perhaps the longest running literature on the principal-agent 
problem, dating back at least as far as the 1920s. Indeed, the basic tenets of corporate law are built around the 
responsibilities and protections of principals vis-à-vis the actions of agents. This literature is often not referenced in 
the overviews of the social scientific work on agency theory perhaps, in part, because the literature tends to be very 
specific about the legal questions that arise in the fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities of principals of 
corporations. There have been important examples of theoretically-driven work in the legal literature—particularly 
in the field of law and economics—that have engaged with economics on these issues (e.g., Kornhauser 1982; Tirole 
1986; Hart 1989, 1993). 
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that the agent is most likely serving many masters, many of them with conflicting interests. Even 
if the agent is able to silence his or her own interests, there is the matter of how to maneuver 
through the tangled loyalties he or she owes to many different principals and how to negotiate 
through their competing interests and sometimes irreconcilable differences.” 
While economic studies of agency have rarely taken on the issue of multiple principals, 
there are a few notable exceptions. For example, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) formally 
modeled the general problem of multiple principals (what they refer to as the “common agency” 
problem), examining the conditions under which multiple principals will produce optimal 
outcomes. Mazzetti (1997) has also approached the issue from a general formal modeling 
framework, examining the information asymmetry that obtains for the common agent in 
multiple-principal frameworks. Other scholars have dealt with this issue through formal 
modeling in specific empirical settings such as sharecropping (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982, 
1986) and the phenomenon of common marketing agents (Bernheim and Whinston 1985).  
 A number of studies of political institutions have examined the issue of multiple 
principals. In one early study in this vein, Wood (1988, 1989) examined the actions of the 
Environmental Protection Agency under the Reagan Administration, finding that the actions of 
the EPA could only be understood if one took into account the multiple principals at work in the 
US political system. Other scholars have looked beyond the EPA to show that an adequate 
understanding of political processes in general must include the multiple principals (Calvert et al. 
1989; Spiller 1990; Bender and Moe 1986). More recently, Neilson and Tierney (2003) have 
examined the issue of multiple principals in the context of international organizations, looking 
specifically at the work of the World Bank. They conclude that a multiple principals or common 
agency theoretical perspective is essential for gaining a clear sense of the pressures the World 
Bank and other international organizations face. 
 While this line of research has been important for advancing principal-agent theory in the 
realm of politics, the problem of multiple principals with respect to the corporation has been 
largely left out of the theoretical discussion. Few studies in this vein have considered the 
corporation as part of the multiple principal problem, because, according to some, the 
institutional structure of ownership in the corporation renders the problem irrelevant. As 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986, p. 924) explain, “When principals act collectively, application of 
the bilateral agency framework (treating the set of principals as a single entity) is appropriate. 
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Thus, the relationship between the stockholders and managers of a publicly held corporation may 
be treated as a traditional principal-agent problem even when stockholders disagree about the 
firm’s objectives, since institutional procedures guarantee a collective decision concerning 
management compensation.” This view, however, begins with too narrow of a definition of 
corporate principals and their influence (Stiglitz 1985; Adams 1996).  
When shareholders are dispersed—as in the case of free-floating stock—Bernheim and 
Whinston’s assumptions are reasonable. It is rare that individual shareholders can act in a 
collective fashion as Bernheim and Whinston assert. However, there are two features of the 
global economy today that change this equation: the role of institutional investors and the 
globalization of investment. As to the first, institutional investors have significantly altered the 
extent to which individual shareholders can have a significant voice in issues of corporate 
governance. There have been well-publicized cases of this dynamic including the shareholder 
activism of the London-based Pension Investment Research Corporation (PIRC) (Sharp-Paine 
1999) and the aggressive social activism of California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) (Light and Lorsch 1999). In the finance and management literatures a number of 
scholars have taken a more systematic approach to this issue, studying the ways in which 
institutional investors allow individuals to overcome the collective action challenges that 
individual shareholders face. For example, Nesbitt (1994) and Smith (1996) have both examined 
the impact of CalPERS’s activism on corporate performance. Carleton et al. (1998) have 
conducted a similar analysis of the impact of TIAA-CREF on corporate governance outcomes. 
Wahal (1996) has looked beyond the impact of a single fund, looking at the impact of the nine 
largest pension funds on corporate performance. Other scholars have examined the ways in 
which institutional investors influence corporate governance following takeovers (Jones et al. 
1997), corporate spending on R&D (David et al. 2001), and general corporate social performance 
(Graves and Waddock 1994; Johnson and Greening 1999). Though few of these studies are 
explicitly engaged with the agency literature, their empirical conclusions have clear implications 
for the ability of shareholders of publicly-traded corporations to overcome the problem of 
ownership dispersion in their capacity as principals and to have an impact on the agents that 
represent their interests. Yet, these studies do not challenge Bernheim and Whinston’s theoretical 
point that corporations are exempt from the discussion of the multiple principal problem. As 
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noted above, in today’s economy, it is increasingly likely that institutional investors may sit as 
principals alongside other types of principals that have different agendas.  
Second, as institutional investors from around the world expand their global reach to 
invest in developing and transforming economies around the world, there is also significant 
potential for institutional investors to approach corporate profitability from very different 
ideologies, agendas, and perspectives. Giddy et al. (1996) examined the impact of institutional 
investors in the emergence of the single European capital market. Boutchkova and Meggison 
(2000) studied the impact of private shareholders and institutional investors on the stability of 
privatization processes around the world since the 1980s. Some scholars have emphasized just 
how important the impact of the variety of institutional contexts can be. Jacoby (2002), for 
example, is skeptical about the impact or the will to actually engage in issues of corporate 
governance, but he argues that we cannot underestimate the diversity of institutional contexts in 
which different institutional investors and other types of principals sit. Institutional investors 
from diverse contexts would have very different approaches to the corporations of which they are 
the principals. Let us look, for example, at the concrete case of the Chinese oil conglomerate 
PetroChina. Formed in 1999 as a subsidiary of the state-owned Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), PetroChina’s initial public offering was backed by Goldman Sachs and 
UBS. The IPO was initially met with high profile resistance in the market, as powerful 
institutional investors such as TIAA-CREF and CalPERS vowed to steer clear of the stock based 
on human rights, environmental, and transparency concerns. However, other institutional 
investors saw opportunity: as a holder of nearly ten percent of the available shares, Berkshire 
Hathaway is now one of the company’s key principals. Its holdings are dwarfed by CNPC’s 
stake—about 40 percent of available shares—but both investors are principals with significant 
resources at stake. However, as a principal from afar with a focus on the metrics of Wall Street, 
Berkshire Hathaway almost certainly has very different ideas about development, profitability, 
and performance than CNPC, as the firm’s other key principal, does.  
 
Ownership Concentration as the Mechanism for Overcoming Diverse Agendas 
These two changes in the global economy form the core of our theoretical argument about the 
multiple principal problem as it applies to corporations: (i) institutional investors give 
shareholders a collective voice and with multiple institutional investors acting as principals there 
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can certainly be multiple principals seeking to influence the agents as they carry out their work 
for the corporation. And (ii) in the global economy, institutional investors can invest in capital 
markets around the world, in many cases alongside local institutional investors. As these two 
circumstances begin to coincide, the problem of multiple principals with diverse agendas and 
goals becomes an increasingly likely scenario. So how do principals overcome the problem? The 
answer we propose is relatively simple and one that can be found in economies around the world: 
ownership concentration. 
Many scholars have examined the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance across a variety of contexts, and the literature is replete with data on the positive 
relationship between these two factors. For example, Amihud and Lev (1999) have looked at the 
link between ownership concentration and diversification, arguing that firms with concentrated 
owners are more focused on specific niches and are, therefore, better performers overall. Boeker 
and Goodstein (1993) examined the relationships among ownership concentration, firm 
performance, and CEO succession. Thompsen and Pedersen (2000) also find a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance (shareholder value and 
profitability) in the largest European companies, though they find that the “identity” of the 
shareholder actually matters in significant ways as well.  
A number of agency theorists have argued that the collective action problem is a 
fundamental feature of low-ownership concentration; higher ownership concentration partially 
solves this problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Schleifer and Vishnay 1986). In a system of 
dispersed ownership, the collective action problem dictates that no one owner (or group of 
owners) will take the lead in forcing firms to behave in a fashion that is accountable to 
shareholders. Conversely, as ownership becomes more concentrated, owners have greater 
incentives to monitor and influence firms to behave in ways that will maximize shareholder 
value. In addition, as ownership concentration rises, owners also have greater influence over the 
actions that firms take to maximize shareholder value. As Boeker and Goodstein (1993, p. 176) 
put it, in cases of dispersed ownership, “no individual’s ownership position is large enough for 
that individual to have an incentive to invest in the monitoring and costs necessary to keep 
management acting in his or her interests… If ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals, the free-rider problem is reduced.” Thus, ownership concentration allows for a 
greater capacity for owners to monitor and influence firm behavior, and it also better aligns the 
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interests of owners with firm outcomes. Further, while ownership concentration of large outside 
shareholders may reduce managerial incentives, it also creates stability for the organizations and 
thereby enhances firm performance (Burkart et al. 1997, 2000).  
We argue here that ownership concentration also serves as the mechanism that allows 
multiple principals to overcome the problems that might arise from having diverse agendas. This 
is true for several reasons. First, while ownership concentration allows powerful principals to 
overcome the collective action problem, it also allows them to gain control and have greater 
influence than competing principals. In 1996, when the London-based Pension Investment 
Research Corporation proposed Resolution 10 at Royal/Dutch Shell’s annual board meeting to 
make the company more accountable to social issues (in response to the company’s role in Ken 
Saro-wiwa’s execution by the Nigerian government), the company’s response was to marshal 
support from its other largest institutional investors—principals that could coordinate their 
actions and overcome the move by PIRC (Sharp-Paine 1999). In the example described above, 
CNPC has a specific set of economic goals for PetroChina that fit with the developmental goals 
of the Chinese government and likely diverge somewhat from the economic models typical for a 
principal like Berkshire Hathaway. Having the power to influence PetroChina’s decision-making 
processes and economic strategies depends, in part, on the concentration of ownership. 
Ownership concentration allows principals to gain control of the firms they own, allowing them 
to monitor firm behavior and to stabilize firm behavior in emerging markets.  
Taken to its logical conclusion, this view might suggest that a single principal—such as 
the state in state-owned firms—is superior to multiple principals. Thus, our theoretical argument 
here requires a corollary: a few major principals is always better than a single dominant 
principal. Having multiple principals with a significant stake in the company and an interest in 
seeing the company do well can also serve the company’s success. Multiple principals with 
concentrated ownership can expand the information pool and provide advice that is grounded in 
a vested interest in the company’s economic well-being. Having Berkshire Hathaway (and, by 
extension, Warren Buffett) as an interested principal would almost certainly have positive 
implications for the company’s access to seasoned advice about efficient organizational 
operation. Similarly, having CNPC as an interested principal gives PetroChina advantages in 
strategic developments around the world: with the Chinese government as the key principal, 
PetroChina benefits directly from national strategies the government might have involving the 
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procurement of oil. Such alliances among principals across the globe can also create dynamics in 
which institutional investors can represent the company to the outside world. In early 2007, when 
CNPC’s ties to the Sudanese government and the crisis in Darfur again surfaced in the news, it 
was Warren Buffett who became the face of PetroChina to Wall Street investors, asking for 
caution in rushing to judgment of the company and seeking to draw the distinction between the 
activities of PetroChina and CNPC.  
Our main argument here is that ownership concentration has a robust enough association 
with positive firm performance across market economies that the issue must be about more than 
principals overcoming collective action problems and their ability to monitor firms. Ownership 
concentration also gives a significant voice in the firm to the dominant principal, which might 
adhere to different economic ideologies than other major principals. It may also allow multiple 
principals to share best practices for firm governance. In the pages that follow, we test these 
issues in an analysis of the economic performance of China’s domestic publicly-traded firms.  
 
MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL FIRMS IN CHINA’S TRANSITION ECONOMY 
China’s domestic public economy provides a testing ground for the interplay of multiple 
principals with diverse agendas and ownership concentration. Our objective here is not to detail 
the processes of reform that have transformed China over the last two-and-a-half decades; rather 
it is to highlight a few of the key institutions that are necessary for our analysis of ownership 
concentration in China’s capital markets. The Chinese case is an extreme case of the 
phenomenon of multiple principals, because institutional investors from advanced capitalist 
economies are principals right alongside the Chinese state. However, it is by no means an 
isolated case of this phenomenon, as it is the case in nearly every transition economy that former 
state agencies are shareholders—albeit through different institutional mechanisms—in the 
publicly traded economy (Guthrie et al. 2007). As our discussion above should illuminate, we 
view the case of China as a test of the abstract case of multiple owners coming together and the 
roles these owners have in light of the issue of ownership concentration. Further, the features of 
our dataset (which we describe in greater detail below) also allow us to test the interplay among 
these issues in a unique way. The most important approach we take here is to view ownership 
along a continuum rather than existing in stark categories. Viewing ownership as existing along a 
continuum has several benefits. First, it incorporates a view of property rights that is more 
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nuanced than the typical state-versus-private perspective allows. Indeed, in many cases—and 
certainly in the case of China—it is far too simplistic to think of firms as being either state- or 
privately-owned. It is often the case that the state, state asset management agencies (which are 
part of the state but also operate like private agencies), and private owners all own some 
percentage of shares of these gradually transforming companies. Thus, it makes little sense to 
think of these organizations as categorical ownership types. Second, this view of property rights 
allows us to assess the relative strength of multiple owners. Third, this view of property rights 
incorporates an analytical perspective that has long been held in the legal field (dating back to 
Hohfeld’s [1913] re-conceptualization of property rights nearly a century ago) and has recently 
also been incorporated into conceptual analyses of China’s economic reforms, where scholars 
have emphasized the ways in which gradual reforms have led to different mixes of ownership 
types (Oi and Walder 1999; Walder 1995; Guthrie 2006; Guthrie and Wang 2007). 
 China’s gradualist economic reforms have been well-documented from many different 
perspectives across the social sciences. While countries like Russia followed Western advice—
constructing market institutions at a rapid pace, immediately removing the state from control 
over the economy, and rapidly privatizing property—China took its time in implementing 
institutional change in a gradual and incremental fashion. As the state has gradually receded 
from control over the economy, it also took the time to experiment with new institutions and to 
implement them incrementally within the context of existing institutional arrangements 
(Naughton 1995; Rawski 1994, 1995, 1999; Chen et al. 1988; Walder 1995a, 1995b; Guthrie 
1999, 2006). In the 1980s, this amounted to localizing the managerial control over enterprises to 
provincial, municipal, township, and village level governments (Walder 1995a; Oi 1989, 1992, 
1995; Qian and Roland 1998; Che and Qian 1998). Nevertheless, despite the process of 
decentralizing ownership and control, the state maintained a strong ownership stake in the 
economy as we will describe in greater detail below.  
 
Privatization and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
In the 1990s, the focus was on building the institutions that would continue to push along the 
reforms of the state sector while, at the same time, attracting foreign capital through capital 
markets (Guthrie 2006; Guthrie and Wang 2007). Accordingly, coinciding with the legislative 
changes of the 1990s was the founding of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The first 
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of these, the Shanghai exchange, opened for business on December 19, 1990, with the Shenzhen 
Exchange opening shortly thereafter. By the end of 2004, the number of domestically listed 
companies in China had risen to 1371 with a total market capitalization of 525.6 billion US 
dollars (SSEa 2004; SSEb 2004; Hertz 1998; Gao 2002). Following the gradualist model, the 
Chinese government’s construction of the institutions that govern public ownership has been 
spread across the period. After a series of regulations such as “the Opinions on Standardizing the 
Joint Stock Limited Companies” and “the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of 
Issuing and Trading of Stocks”, the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC 
1999) was adopted in 1998 at the Ninth National People’s Congress and took effect in July of 
1999, thus institutionalizing the legal basis for the standardized operation of listed companies.2 
The law itself contains 12 chapters, covering a range of issues from stock issuance and stock 
transactions to the rules governing ownership and shareholding of publicly-listed companies. 
Finally, in 2001, the Central Government passed The Tentative Measures for Decreasing State 
Shareholding (PRC 2001). Yet, as China has been systematically constructing the institutions of 
a publicly traded economy, even in the area of public ownership of listed companies, we must 
acknowledge the complexities of enterprise-state relations in the Chinese model, as the 
government’s receding from control over publicly-listed state enterprises has, like every other 
institutional change in the Chinese economic reforms, been a gradual process. The companies 
listed on China’s domestic stock exchanges are becoming “privatized” in some ways. A typical 
ownership transformation for a state-owned enterprise would allow the state to retain between 30 
and 40% of the company’s shares; between 30 and 40% of the shares are designated for 
institutional shares; the remaining 30% of shares are designated for public consumption as free 
floating shares.  
While public ownership has fundamentally transformed ownership structures of many 
formerly state-owned enterprises, enterprise-state relations in the Chinese system have remained 
considerably complex, as the state maintains a significant share in publicly-traded firms. Figure 1 
                                                 
2 The Company Law (PRC 1994) laid the foundation for this standardization. This law governed the process of 
converting enterprises into shareholding companies and stipulated that companies funded by investing bodies of 
different ownerships were all equal under the law. More importantly, this law encouraged enterprises to build new 
corporate structures and standardize organizational bodies (mainly with regard to shareholder meetings, corporate 
boards and managers) in order to further block political interventions in the decision-making of enterprise, marking 
a fundamental shift in the organization of China’s industrial economy, as Chinese organizations can now apply for 
the status of the Limited-liability Company [youxian zeren gongsi] or a Limited-shares Company [gufen youxian 
gongsi] and thus assume the mantle of independent legal entities. 
  -12-
shows the shifting organizational relationships of a typical publicly-listed firm as well as the 
ownership categories that emerge over the course of the initial public offering process. The left-
hand side of the figure shows the organizational changes that occur as part of an organization is 
spun off for an IPO. Most often it is the case that a listed company is the strongest performing 
factory or group of factories in a larger group company [jituan gongsi].3 The state office 
overseeing the group usually has a heavy hand in deciding which part of the group will be spun 
off for the IPO. The state maintains the basic state-firm relationship with the remaining part of 
the group company—it remains on as the advisory administrative office, playing a significant 
role in the strategic decisions the firm or group makes as well as maintaining a hand as the partial 
residual claimant on firm profits.4 The IPO firm becomes a separate legal entity, subject to the 
Company Law and the Securities Law independent of the group. In some cases in which firms 
are not part of a group, the entire factory may go public; however, IPO processes more often 
involve a spin-off situation. In the initial stages of the IPO, the state administrative office and the 
group company will maintain control over between 20 and 60 percent of the shares, though in the 
early years of the stock exchanges these numbers were closer to 70%. The remainder of the 
shares is divided between various types of institutional and free-floating shares.5 
(Figure 1 about here) 
The state has also maintained a role in these firms through the emergence of state-owned 
asset management companies [guoyou zichan jingying gongsi], which generally report directly to 
the recently-formed State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
which has come to control 6.9 Trillion yuan (about $8.65 Billion) in assets since its founding in 
2003. (We might think of SASAC and its local subsidiaries as “institutional investors” as they 
are organizations set up to manage a portfolio of assets.) Although China has been careful to 
always follow its own path with respect to the transformation of the economy—especially in 
                                                 
3 Under the planned economy, large state-owned factories generally reported directly to the ministries [bu] (central 
government), provincial bureaus [ting], or municipal bureaus [ju] that govern a given sector (Guthrie 1999). Over 
the course of the economic reforms, as the central, provincial, and municipal governments began to recede from the 
direct control over factories in their jurisdictions, factories in some sectors were placed into group companies, and 
coordinated economic decision making as a coalition of organizations (Keister 1998, 2000). 
4 “Independent budgets” [duli hesuan] have meant that firms themselves are partial residual claimants on profits, 
however, among large state-owned firms, the administrative office still has access to this income.  
5 The categories of shares depicted in Figure 1 are: State Shares [guojia gu], State Institutional Shares [guoyou faren 
gu], Non-State Institutional Shares [feiguoyou faren gu], Domestic Institutional Shares [jingnei faren gu], Foreign 
institutional Shares [jingwai faren gu], Founder Shares [faqiren faren gu], Private Group Shares [dingxia faren gu], 
Public Group Shares [shehui faren gu], Free Floating Shares [liudong gu]. 
  -13-
avoiding rapid privatization—the formation of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
changed this equation. In order to attract institutional investors from abroad, the state needed to 
demonstrate a commitment to a declining presence in these publicly listed firms. It did so 
through the creation of state-owned asset management companies and ultimately the formation 
of SASAC.6  
By separating out these different types of ownership, we focus our analysis of the impact 
of ownership concentration in Chinese publicly-traded firms, net of the effects of different types 
ownership—state, state-institutional, and private. We analyze these data as panel data to examine 
the effects of the degrees of state ownership and ownership concentration. Following Holz 
(2002), we focus on the profitability of this group of firms with the view that profitability tells us 
more about the economic success of these firms than other measures of productivity.  
 
Hypotheses 
Ownership—We begin our discussion of the hypotheses with a focus on the variables that relate 
to the different types of owners of Chinese firms. Scholars have taken a range of views on the 
continuing role of the state as a principal in transition economies. Economists such as Janos 
Kornai (1980, 1990) and Jeffrey Sachs (1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b) have argued that state 
ownership is anathema to a well-functioning market economy. State ownership, the argument 
goes, leads inevitably to rent-seeking, graft and other forms of corruption, while the discipline of 
the market is the most effective (and parsimonious) path to efficient market behavior. The 
arguments of these scholars fit well with the widely held view that private ownership will 
ultimately lead to more efficient outcomes than state ownership. But we do not even need to go 
so far as predicting corruption and rent-seeking; indeed, the basic issue is simply that state-
backed principals have different incentives than those from the private sector, and there is an 
extensive literature taking this position dating back to the classic works of economists like 
                                                 
6 At this early stage, in practical terms, little changed for these offices—they still employed the same people and 
they still maintained the same relationships with the firms under their jurisdictions in terms of managerial and 
ownership control. Today, there are literally hundreds of organizations in the Chinese economy that used to be 
government administrative offices and now call themselves asset management companies or that are owned by state 
offices. The largest and most famous of these are the AMC’s connected to each of the four main Central 
Government banks (set up to help these banks move bad loans off of their books); however, there are many more 
spread throughout the economy today. As with the AMCs owned by the banks, these smaller AMCs are usually 
owned by a local government administrative office. We examine the extent to which the emergence of these new 
institutions has influenced the governance of SOEs in recent years. 
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Harold Demsetz (1967, 1968) and George Stigler (1975; Stigler and Friedland 1962) and Sam 
Peltzman (1971). As Hanke and Walters (1987, p. 105) put it, “Private enterprises should be 
expected to be more efficient than public enterprises precisely because a private owner stands to 
gain enhanced wealth from improvements in efficiency, reductions in cost, and the like… Private 
owners face significant incentives to monitor the behavior of managers and employees so that 
they will supply what consumers demand and do so in a cost-effective way.”  
However, virtually all of the arguments about the inefficiency of state ownership are 
based on a single-owner framework. What happens when the state is only one of several 
principals of a firm? We might expect similar kinds of inefficiencies to continue to be associated 
with state ownership, but its effect would depend upon whether the state is the dominant owner. 
Thus, we would expect to see negative effects on firm performance if principals from the state 
sector are dominant and positive effects on firm performance if principals from the private sector 
are dominant. We expect to see these associations both in terms of overall profitability. 
Hypothesis 1a: Having a dominant principal from the private sector will have a net 
positive effect on firm profitability (net and cash operating profits), compared to cases in 
which the Chinese state is the dominant principal. 
As we described above, it is often more appropriate to think of ownership as existing 
along a continuum. Thus, it might also be tied to the relative weight of the state and private 
sector’s influences. In our framework of multiple principles, different types of owners all come 
together to influence the behavior of the firm. There may be cases in which the state is the 
dominant owner, but the other private principles have a significant stake in the firm as well. The 
private sector principal’s ability to exert influence should increase proportionally with the size of 
its holdings. Thus, we expect to find similar associations existing along a continuum of 
ownership among different types of principals. 
Hypothesis 1b: As the percentage of shares controlled by private sector principals 
increases, profitability will increase. 
In China, however, there is some evidence that, under certain circumstances, the state has 
played a positive role in guiding firms to profitability. Some scholars have explored this issue by 
examining the nature of state involvement and the conditions under which state ownership has 
given rise to firm profitability. Walder (1995a) argued that the success of the Township and 
Village Enterprise economy in the 1980s lay in the fact that local officials, operating under 
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tightening fiscal constraints, along with significant pressure from the fact that the work units in 
their townships were the main source of social welfare, had the correct incentives to help the 
enterprises under their jurisdictions succeed. Oi (1989, 1992, 1995) made a similar argument 
based upon the parts of the rural economy she examined, calling the phenomenon local state 
corporatism. Guthrie (2005) showed the conditions under which state involvement in the urban 
industrial economy helped guide firms to successful outcomes in the reform era. The basic 
argument among these scholars is that gradual reform meant that the bureaucratic sector slowly 
pushed economic responsibilities on the shoulders of local officials and individual managers. As 
economic responsibilities were shifted onto the shoulders of enterprise managers and the local 
officials that governed them, local-level actors were able to experiment with new ways of 
participating in the global economy. They also experienced a sense of stability in the process, as 
state owners helped to gradually wean them off their dependence on budgetary allocations from 
the state while learning the rules of effective market behavior. The combination of tightening 
fiscal constraints and the close monitoring and attention these lower-level governmental offices 
could give to the few factories under their jurisdictions allowed these factories to receive the 
most hands-on attention and guidance through the turbulent waters of the economic reforms. 
Close monitoring by local officials meant a level of security and continuity even as budget 
constraints were being hardened and the competitive pressures of China’s emerging markets 
were proceeding apace.  
 The logic of the arguments about the positive impact of state involvement hinges on the 
nature of that involvement. State involvement can come in a variety of forms, and under the right 
institutional conditions it can produce a constellation of incentives and capacity for a given state 
office to effectively guide the firm(s) under its jurisdiction through the reforms. Accordingly, for 
this population of firms, we expect that the impact of state involvement in firm governance is 
going to depend on the nature of the state involvement. The vast majority of state controlled 
shares [guojia gu] (Figure 1, category 1) lay in the hands of the very high-level administrative 
offices that have performed the poorest in the economic reforms. However, as we discussed 
above, the emergence of state-owned asset management companies and the governmental 
commission SASAC may constitute a critical institutional change in the Chinese industrial 
economy over the course of the last decade (guyou faren gu or Figure 1, category 2Aa). While 
we have argued that these organizations are still ultimately owned by the state, we also argue that 
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these organizations represent a gradual progression away from the direct state ownership of the 
early parts of the reform area. We expect that SASAC will have a more positive effect on firm 
performance than classic state ownership, because SASAC brings benefits of state involvement, 
yet it is at the same time solely committed to firm performance in ways that the administrative 
offices, which retain pure state shares, are not. Following the hypotheses we have articulated 
above, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: Having SASAC as a dominant principal will have a positive effect on firm 
profitability, compared to state-ownership, but not as large of a positive effect as private 
ownership.  
Hypothesis 2b: As the percentage of shares owned by SASAC increase, firm profitability 
will increase but at a slower rate than the effect of private shares.  
Ownership Concentration—The Chinese State, SASAC and the private sector represent 
principals with very different sets of incentives and interests. The state-backed principals of 
large-scale state enterprises, for example, may be more interested in keeping large numbers of 
workers employed or in strategic issues vis-à-vis international energy development than they are 
in firm efficiency. How owners overcome these differences in agendas, we argue, is closely tied 
to a basic mechanism that principals use in many market economies around the world—
ownership concentration. As described above, many studies of publicly-traded firms around the 
world have established the positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. We have argued that there are many benefits to ownership concentration, which 
include the solving of the multiple principal problems.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
As Figure 2 shows, over the course of the last decade, ownership has become more and 
more concentration among the largest owners of China’s domestic publicly-traded firms. In the 
case of China, ownership concentration has positive implications for firm performance for a 
variety of reasons. First, with the volatility of the relatively immature Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges, higher ownership concentration means protection from the speculative 
practices that dominate the free-floating share markets. This is not a huge issue in the Chinese 
stock exchanges, as the percentage of free-floating shares of any given company is relatively 
low. However, given the volatility of these exchanges—fueled by rampant speculative activity 
over the course of their first decade—ownership concentration does help mitigate this effect. 
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Second, ownership concentration means a greater amount of focused attention on the economic 
performance of firms—as a management issue, firm performance is tied to the incentives of a 
few owners who are able to focus attention on how to make the firm most profitable. As one of 
our interviewees, the founder of one of Shanghai’s first institutional investing company, put it, 
“What we look for is good management. We don’t care if they are state-owned or privately-
owned. All we care about is whether they getting good advice. There are bad owners on both the 
state and private side. We are just focused on governance and performance.”7 Third, as we 
argued about state ownership above, in the turbulent markets of a transition economy, having 
ownership shares concentrated in the hands of a few powerful owners allows for greater stability 
as managers learn the practices of the emerging market economy. One of the key factors in these 
relationships is that capacity of owners to monitor the firms under their control. Indeed, as 
argued by both Walder (1995a) and Guthrie (1997, 2005), one of the factors allowing firms to 
succeed under state control lies in the capacity of administrative offices to monitor the firms 
under their jurisdictions. This capacity of and incentive for owners to monitor firms depends 
heavily on how concentrated their ownership stake in a given firm is. Fourth, it is likely that 
ownership concentration helps mitigate the corruption of local officials and firm managers. 
While a number of scholars have argued that corruption is an inevitable outcome of continued 
state ownership (Kornai 1980, 1990; Sachs 1992, 1995), this assumption depends upon the 
ability of firm managers to act without being monitored by bodies that have the ability to 
influence their actions—an assumption that does not necessarily fit with reality in China’s 
transition. Under certain conditions, owners will have incentives to monitor firms and thereby 
shift the behaviors of corrupt officials. This was the case with concentration ownership in the 
rural economy in the 1980s (Walder 1995a), and it is the case with large-scale industrial 
enterprises that have been recently listed on the domestic stock exchanges. As such, we expect to 
find a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability as well as 
firm efficiency (measured in operating margins). Finally, the key issue, we argue, is that owners 
need to exercise some level of control so that allows firm strategy to be in alignment with their 
key owners. The primary way to set up this alignment is to place the ownership in the hands of a 
few owners. 
                                                 
7 Interview with first author (Shanghai, 2005). 
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Hypothesis 3: As ownership concentration increases, firm profitability (net and cash 
operating) will increase. 
Ownership Concentration in Increasingly Competitive Markets—While there is a good 
deal of scholarship on the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance, few studies 
have empirically tested the ideas as they might apply to the logical extensions of the theory. For 
example, if it is true that ownership concentration has a positive relationship with firm 
performance, it would also follow that ownership concentration would become more important 
as markets become more competitive. It is rarely possible to test such assumptions, because such 
analyses would depend on an analysis of the evolution of markets over time. However, in the 
relatively immature markets of China’s emerging market economy, it is reasonable to assume 
that these markets have become more competitive over the last two-and-a-half decades of 
operation. Thus, we can also assume that ownership concentration has become more important 
for firms operating in these markets over time. 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of ownership concentration will increase over time.  
Multiple Owners—We have argued that, despite the fact that ownership concentration 
allows owners with diverse incentives to overcome the problem of diverse agendas among 
multiple principals, it is nevertheless a positive factor in firm performance to have multiple 
owners with a significant interest in the firm. Even with different agendas, minority owners can 
contribute in a variety of ways, such as, contributing an outside director for the board, sharing 
knowledge and strategies, or being an advocate for the firm abroad. Thus, we expect that there 
will be a positive relationship between having multiple owners with a significant stake in the 
firm and firm profitability. 
Hypothesis 5: Having multiple owners with a significant stake in a firm will have a 
positive relationship with firm profitability (net and cash operating). 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
We analyze the performance of Chinese publicly listed firms from 1994-2003. We analyze these 
data as a panel with annual year controls. Our starting point for data on Chinese listed companies 
is the WindDB database, which reports all of the financial data for publicly-listed firms in 
China’s domestic economy. In 1994, there were a total of 338 stocks listed in China. By 2003, 
the number was 1371. From the database, we obtained the information of shareholders who hold 
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5% or more in each of these listed companies. With the goal of uncovering who actually owned 
shares in each company in a given year—as opposed to the listed shareholder—we also traced 
the owners of each listed shareholding entity through supplementary information including 
company’s annual reports, announcements, website information, stock market research by stock 
analysts, and so forth. In some cases, we uncovered up to six identifiable layers of ownership 
“shells”. We coded each real shareholder (the ultimate owner as opposed to the shell) and further 
investigation revealed that, among the top ten owners of each company, the real owners of most 
listed companies fall into three categories: (1) State shares [guojia gu], which includes central 
government, provincial governments, municipal governments of five cities (that report directly to 
the central government in the planning system: Dalian, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenzhen and Xiamen) 
and state-owned enterprises. (2) Institutional investors [faren gu], which include state 
institutional investors (“state-owned asset management companies”), non-state, domestic, 
foreign, founders, and private investors. (3) Free-floating shares. Due to missing data and 
differential reports among some shares/companies, the final available data for our study are from 
328 companies in 1994 and 1305 companies in 2003. These numbers differ from the numbers 
listed above (particularly in the case of 1371 versus 1305) because in a number of cases, A and B 
shares are listed as different companies, when in fact they are listings of the same company. 
Once correcting for this factor, our actual number of cases that are omitted due to missing data 
are 15 cases or less than 1% of the population in 2003.8 
                                                 
8 There are important potential biases to consider with respect to these data. It is crucial to note here that in no cases 
on the domestic exchanges from 1994-2003 does a firm, once it is listed, drop out of the sample. Thus, we do not 
have a problem here of censorship due to nonrandom dropping out of the sample. A larger concern, however, has to 
do with selection bias in the listing of a company. As we described above, companies are selected by their governing 
administrative office (zhuguan bumen) to be listed on the stock exchanges. They are usually part of a larger group or 
cluster of factories. As such, there is an obvious selection bias in the ways in which companies are chosen for their 
listing on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges—state offices choose the best performing firms under their 
jurisdictions to be listed on the exchanges. And since we are examining firm performance, the very selection process 
itself is correlated with the dependent variables. However, we view this bias as less problematic than it might 
initially seem. The main reason for this is that we are dealing with a specific population of firms, and our 
comparisons are within this population. In other words, all firms suffer from the same selection bias, so there is a 
systematic bias that makes these firms comparable to each other. Thus, we are less concerned with the question of 
whether our firms are a representative sample of State-Owned Organizations in China—they are not. In this sense, 
we are more concerned with size, direction, and robustness of the effects we are analyzing than we are with 
statistical significance. But they are a population that is overwhelmingly selected through the same process and is 
there comparable within the sample. And because we are basically dealing with the entire population of firms, we 
are not concerned with the issue of sampling from within this population. 
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 Two approaches to the interrogation of this question have become common. One of these 
examines the effectiveness of privatization by comparing the performance of privatized firms 
with those that are still governed by state ownership (e.g., Boardman and Vining 1989; Pohl et 
al. 1997; Frydman et al. 1999); a second compares the performance of firms over time, as they 
make the transition from state-owned to private (Megginson et al. 1994). We take an alternative 
approach to this problem. We look at the degree of state ownership in publicly-traded firms. 
Conceiving of state ownership as a continuous variable of the percentage of shares owned by a 
given state office, we look at the impact that percentage ownership has on various performance 
outcomes. Because this variable is a continuous variable, it is not framed as a binary comparison 
of state-owned or not; rather the notion of the degree of state ownership allows us to examine of 
question of whether an increase in state ownership has positive, negative, or neutral effects on a 
firm’s performance. However, despite the fact that this is not a binary comparison, there is an 
implicit comparison in the analysis, because, as state ownership declines the stake controlled by 
other shareholders increases. Second, we also look at the degree of state institutional ownership 
(shares controlled by SASAC) to test the same sets of questions regarding the proportion of 
shares controlled by the asset management companies. Third, we look at the shares owned by 
private institutional owners (Figure 1, categories 2B and 2C). Fourth, we also look at the extent 
to which ownership is concentrated in the hands of the state and institutional investors (as 
opposed to free-floating shares). Understanding the impact of ownership concentration is crucial 
for understanding the performance of these firms, as it leads to a separate set of issues about 
governance and shareholder influence above and beyond the issue of state ownership and 
control.  
Dependent variables: Following Holz (2002) we focus on the profitability and operating 
margins of these organizations: dependent variables include net profits, cash operating (EBIT) 
profits, and the operating margins of the firm. Net profits are calculated as gross profits minus 
indirect costs (i.e., costs not directly attributable to production that were already removed from 
sales revenues to arrive at the gross profit figure). EBIT profits are earnings before deducting 
interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, and other non-operating items.9 Performance or 
operating margins are calculated as EBIT profits divided by revenues.  
                                                 
9 We should note that, while conventional approaches to models such as these would typically log the dependent 
variables—particularly in the cases of the two profitability variables—our models do not take this approach for two 
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Key independent variables: From the areas of inquiry described above, we generate a 
number of key independent variables for our analyses below:  
• State ownership: We test the impact of state ownership in two ways. First, we test this 
issue as a function of the percentage of shares of firm i that are owned by state 
administrative offices other than SASAC (i.e., those shares that are guojia gu, Figure 1, 
category 1). Second, we assign a dummy variable (1=yes) if a state ministry office is the 
largest owner.  
• SASAC ownership: Similar to the state-ownership variables, we look at the percentage of 
shares of firm i that are owned by SASAC (i.e., those shares that are guoyou faren gu, 
Figure 1, category 2Aa), and we assign a dummy variable (1=yes) if SASAC is the 
largest owner.  
• Private ownership: Here again, we look at the percentage of shares of firm i that are 
owned by institutional investors with private interests (i.e., those shares that fall into 
categories 2B+2C in Figure 1), and we assign a dummy variable (1=yes) if a private 
institutional investor occupies the largest ownership category.  
• Multiple owners of >5%: We control for whether a firm has more than one owner holding 
more than 5% of the shares.  
• Ownership concentration (OC): We look at the percentage of shares owned by the top ten 
controlling owners for firm i.10  
• Interaction of OC and time: We address the question of changes in ownership 
concentration over time by including an interaction of ownership concentration and a 
time-trend variable. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reasons. First, there are a significant number of cases that yield negative values on these outcomes, making the 
natural log of the outcome variables undefined in those cases. In order to test the importance of this issue, in 
addition to all of the models presented below, we also ran all of the models based upon the following transformation 
for the Net Profits and EBIT Profits: Yi* = ln[Yi + (│Yc│ + 1)], where Yi represents either the dependent variables 
Net Profits or EBIT Profits and Yc represents the largest negative value for Yi. In none of these models were there 
substantive differences in the magnitude or significance of the effects, so, for the sake of simplicity and 
interpretability of the results, we present results based on the untransformed variables. Second, the distributions of 
the outcome variables are not in the least skewed, with the exception of one outlier. We also ran all untransformed 
models omitting this sole outlier and found no substantive differences from the results we present here. All of these 
results are available upon request from the first author. 
10 We have also run the analyses presented below by looking at the 1-, 3-, and 5-largest owners. For the sake of 
parsimony, we simply report the results for the ownership concentration among the 10 largest owners. However, it is 
noteworthy that, while the effects are the same in the analyses for the top-5 and top-10 owners (virtually identical), 
they are weaker for top 3-owners and they are not significant for analyses of ownership concentration run on the 
single largest owner.  
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Control variables: We also include a number of control variables in our analyses. We 
control for volume of economic activity by including the natural log of sales. We use debt-to-
asset ratio as a measure of firm distress. A dummy variable for firm listing allows us to control 
for differences between the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges (Shenzhen=1). Chinese firms are 
officially broken down into the following categories: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
electronics, construction, transportation, information and technology, trade (wholesale and 
retail), insurance, real estate social services, communications, and “others”. The lion’s share of 
listed firms is categorized as “manufacturing” (57.9%). In addition, the domestic exchanges 
collapse these sectors into five primary categories: agriculture and mining, manufacturing, 
energy and construction, services, and others. We follow these categorizations comparing the 
four combined sectoral categories against the left out category of manufacturing. Finally, we also 
include dummy variables for each year.   
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and definitions for the critical variables 
included in our analysis. As Table 1 shows, over the course of the first decade of publicly-traded 
firms in China, these organizations had revenues of 1.16 billion yuan (~$143 million). The 
average net profit of these firms over the last decade was 69 million yuan (~$8.6 million), and 
cash operating profits averaged 117 million yuan (~$14 million). The average operating margin 
was 21%, and the average price-to-equity ratio was a surprising 111. These firms had an average 
percentage of state shares of 11%, an average percentage of state institutional shares of 13%, and 
an average of percentage shares of less than 1 percent. These numbers are somewhat misleading, 
however, because many of the firms have zeros in each of these categories, a fact that brings the 
overall averages down. The numbers in parentheses beneath the means are the average 
percentages excluding the zero categories; in other words, among firms for which the Chinese 
state is a principal, the state controls an average of about 35% of the shares. Finally, the average 
percentage of shares held by the top ten shareholders for these firms is nearly 60%.  
(Table 1 about here) 
We model the determinants of firm profitability and efficiency using both fixed and 
random effects models: 
Yit = α + γ'Zit + β'(OC)it + δi + λt + εit,   (1) 
where Yit is the outcome for firm i, i = 1, …, n, at time t, t = 1, …, T, Zit is a column vector of 
measured variables, γ is a column vector of regression coefficients corresponding to Zit, β is the 
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effect of ownership concentration (OC)it, and εit is a random error term with mean E(εit │ Zit, 
(OC)it, δi, λt) = 0 and variance σ2. Note that the vector Zit can include lagged dependent variables. 
(Accordingly, we present results for both the lagged and unlagged cases.) 
 In the fixed effects formulation, δi is a fixed constant that represents measured and 
unmeasured time-invariant characteristics of the i(th) firm and λt is a fixed constant that 
represents measured and unmeasured characteristics that vary over time but are common to all 
firms. In this case, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the model 
parameters (α, γ', β', δ1, …, δn, λ1, …, λT). In the random effects formulation, the δi are 
independent and identically distributed random variables representing unmeasured time-invariant 
characteristics of the i(th) firm with mean 0 and variance σδ2. Similarly, the λt are independent 
and identically distributed random variables with mean 0 and variance σλ2 that represent 
unmeasured characteristics that vary over time but are common to all firms. The error term is 
now vit = δi + λt + εit, where the three error components are assumed to be independent of each 
other and independent of regressors. Because the errors vit are correlated, the generalized least 
squares (GLS) estimator is more efficient than the OLS estimator. We used the Hausman 
specification test (Hausman 1978) to adjudicate between these two formulations. In essence, this 
test asks whether the errors vit are correlated with the regressors in the model. If the answer is no, 
the random effects model is better on efficiency grounds. Otherwise, the random effects 
estimator is inconsistent. The results, in some of the models, suggested some correlation between 
the errors and the regressors. However, fixed effects models do not allow us to report time-
invariant parameters, thus eliminating some descriptive nuance in the reported results. Thus, we 
report results of both random and fixed effects models herein.11  
 
RESULTS 
Tables 2 and 3 present the analysis of the profitability of the publicly-traded firms on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Models I and II are directed toward hypotheses 1a and 
2a, showing the effects of SASAC- and private-dominant ownership compared to state-dominant 
                                                 
11 In our empirical analyses, we have also run all models with lagged independent variables where relevant (i.e., all 
variables except for the industry and year controls). We present models with both lagged and unlagged dependent 
variables for a couple of reasons: first, there are no substantive differences between the lagged and unlagged models 
for the key independent variables. However, the interpretation of the fixed effects models with lagged independent 
variables is considerably more complicated. For the sake of simplicity, we present the basic models and the models 
with lagged dependent variables.  
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ownership. Model I shows some support for hypotheses 1a and 2a; there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between private-dominant ownership compared to state-
dominant ownership and a smaller positive effect between of SASAC-dominant ownership. The 
results for EBIT profits are not statistically significant, however, if we treat this group of firms 
not as a sample but as a population of firms (which it is), the effects do come out in the predicted 
orders. Thus, based on Model I, on average, for the population of China’s domestic publicly-
traded firms, controlling for other factors, firms with a dominant SASAC owner make about 
14,600,000 yuan in net profits and 10,200,000 yuan in cash operating profits (about $1.8MM and 
$1.3MM) more than other publicly-traded firms in the domestic economy; private firms make 
about 16,300,000 and 12,600,000 yuan (about $2.04MM and $1.6MM) more than other publicly-
traded firms. Model II is the more rigorous model, because it includes a lagged dependent 
variable. In this Model, the positive effects of SASAC-dominant ownership go away (and even 
reverse for the population), but the effect of private-dominant ownership remains robust to this 
more rigorous test, and is even stronger for EBIT profits. Having a dominant owner from the 
private sector (which is actually a very small proportion of the firms in this population) is worth 
a premium of 13,600,000 and 18,300,000 yuan (about $1.7MM and $2.3MM) for net and cash 
operating profits respectively. Thus, there is strong support for hypothesis 1a but not for 2a. 
Looking at property rights as a continuum and thinking about whether more or less of any 
of these types of ownerships influences firm profitability (hypotheses 1b and 2b), there are not 
strong results for this part of the analysis. Models VII and VIII are the most conservative models 
(firm-level fixed effects with lagged dependent variables), and in both of these cases, the 
percentage of state shares has a negative effect on firm profitability for both net and EBIT 
profits. However, these effects are not statistically significant, so can only be seen as meaningful 
with respect to this population of firms. With respect to this population of firms, for each 
percentage increase in state ownership, firms earn about 240,000 yuan and 350,000 yuan (about 
$30,000 and $44,000) less in net and EBIT profits respectively (based on Model VIII). 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized here that there is not generalizable support for hypotheses 
1b and 2b. 
(Tables 2 and 3 about here) 
  -25-
 There is strong support in our analyses for the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance.12 Let us look first at the relationship between ownership concentration and 
profitability (hypothesis 3). We are going to focus here on all models except models IV, VI, and 
VIII—at first glance, these models make it appear that there is some inconsistency in our 
findings on ownership concentration; however, these effects are picked up in the interaction 
terms suggesting a growing importance of ownership concentration over time (we will address 
this issue below). In all models without the interaction term, there is a strong statistically 
significant positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability. For each 
percentage increase in ownership concentration, there is a 509,000 yuan and 465,000 yuan (about 
$63,000 and $58,000) increase in net and cash operating profits for Chinese publicly-traded 
firms. This is the more conservative of the two estimates: the fixed-effects models (Model VII) 
show a 1.3MM and 1.1MM yuan (about $162,000 and $141,000) premium for each percentage 
increase in ownership concentration.  
 There is also strong support for hypothesis 4 with respect to profitability. With respect to 
both net and cash operating profitability, over time, ownership concentration has increased in 
importance. Figure 3 shows the relationship between ownership concentration and time. We base 
these models on the full random effects model (Model VI). As Figure 3 shows, ownership 
concentration has become more important over time, as markets have become more competitive. 
The slope of this line has become more extreme over the course of this time period; however, the 
starting point of average firm profitability has declined over the same time period. In 1994, 
controlling for the parameters estimated in Model VI, the average firm with 10% concentration 
had net profits of about 103,000,000 yuan. As ownership concentration increased from 10 to 
90%, net profits increased to about 117,000,000 yuan. In 2003, controlling for other factors, the 
average firm of 10% concentration was losing about 42,000,000 yuan per year; however, as 
concentration rose to 90%, net profitability for that same firm would have a predicted value of 
about 141,000,000 yuan. With respect to firm efficiency, there is little evidence of an interaction 
between ownership concentration and time.  
(Figure 3 about here) 
                                                 
12 As noted above, we use the ownership concentration of the ten-largest shareholders in these models. However, 
with ownership concentration of the 5-largest owners, the results look almost exactly the same across the models; 
with respect to the 3-largest owners, the results look the same, albeit with gentler slopes.  
  -26-
There is sample-level support for hypothesis 5, though these results cannot be generalized 
beyond the population of publicly-traded firms China’s domestic stock exchanges. Model I of 
Table 2 shows that there is a statistically significant positive effect of having multiple owners 
with a significant stake in the firm. Firms with multiple principals make about 13,000,000 more 
yuan than those with a single principal with a significant stake. The magnitude of this effect is 
about the same with respect to cash operating profits, however, the effect is not statistically 
significant in this model. In all of the other models throughout Tables 2 and 3, the relationship 
between multiple (significant) principals and profitability remains positive, though it is no longer 
statistically significant and therefore cannot be generalized beyond this population of firms.13  
We also examined our data to see whether the associations discussed above would also 
apply to firm efficiency (operating margins).14 These results were consistent with our above 
findings. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between having a private sector 
principal as the dominant owner and firm efficiency. Firms with dominant principals from the 
private sector do about 2 percent better in terms of operating margins than firms with a dominant 
state owner. There is also a statistically significant positive effect of having SASAC as the 
dominant owner, compared to state ownership—though the effect is less than half of that for 
private-dominant ownership. In addition, there is a negative relationship between the percentage 
of state control and firm efficiency: The greater the level of classic state control, the less efficient 
firms are. On average, for each 10 percentage points of ownership that state ministries maintain 
over firms in the Chinese economy, these firms will be about 1 percent less efficient in terms of 
their operating margins. With respect to ownership concentration, across all models, there is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
efficiency. For each 10% increase in ownership concentration, we see a 1 percent increase in the 
operating efficiency of these firms. Here again, placing this effect in the context of the range that 
appears in Chinese domestic firms (~10-80%), this amounts to a potential net difference of about 
7% in operating margins across the population of firms.  
                                                 
13 It is in exploring this effect that it is particularly important that we reiterate the fact that we ran all of these models 
with lagged independent variables (as noted in footnote 11), as it is with respect to this relationship that an argument 
for reverse causality could be made—it is conceivable that institutional investors increase their holdings of 
profitable firms.  
14 Our measure of operating margins (OM = P/R, where P = profits and R = revenues) is tied to profitability (as P 
appears in the numerator of OM), however, because firms can produce equal levels of profit with different levels of 
revenues (depending on how efficient firms are in terms of their expenditures), it is useful to examine the ratio 
between these variables.  
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(Table 4 about here) 
 
DISCUSSION 
In general, our findings show two key relationships. First, we present the precise impact of the 
various ownership types that matter for China’s publicly-traded firms. There is evidence of a 
negative relationship between continued state ownership (in the classic sense) and firm 
efficiency, and it is clear that private ownership pays significant dividends for firms. There is 
some evidence that governance by SASAC has positive effects for Chinese firms. They are not 
doing as well as the firms that benefit from the guidance of private owners, but they are doing 
better than those that are still owned by the ministries and bureaus. While these results show 
confirm the superiority of firm governance among private owners for profitability and efficiency, 
we should be careful not to interpret these findings as a ringing endorsement of rapid 
privatization plans. Governments making the transition from plan to market must balance the 
benefits of privatization (e.g., higher efficiency for surviving firms) with its costs (e.g., more 
firms going out of business). In the process of gradual transition that China has adopted, the 
benefits are slower to kick in, but the costs are largely mitigated. The Chinese government’s 
strategy with respect to this population of firms has been to gradually introduce new institutions 
(capital markets, new laws and regulations about state ownership) and gradually allow different 
types of owners into the mix. As the SASAC and private owners begin to exert their influence, 
firms do better and better. These results suggest that the Chinese government’s model of 
gradualist institutional reform continues to pay dividends, as the new institutional innovations for 
firm governance are somewhat effective at making firms more profitable, and firms get to 
gradually learn from engagement with private owners. This argument is not so different from 
that articulated by scholars who have argued that the state has had a positive impact on firms in 
the transition economy in cases where it has exercised control over firms (Oi 1992; Walder 
1995a) and that firms have gradually learned to compete from the emerging private economy 
(Naughton 1995; Guthrie 2005, 2006). 
Second, irrespective of ownership type and the level of influence that different types of 
owners exert, as ownership concentration increases, so too does the performance of the firm, 
both in terms of profitability and in terms of firm efficiency. Many scholars have argued that 
ownership concentration helps solve the free-rider problem that agency theorists have associated 
  -28-
with dispersed ownership, and we believe those arguments apply here as well. However, there 
are important issues about ownership concentration that are specific for China. Principals with a 
variety of agendas are competing to control the firms in which they have an ownership stake. 
And when owners with multiple agendas come together, ownership concentration helps owners 
overcome the collective action difficulties that multiple owners face. This is not to say that single 
owners are better than multiple owners—indeed our preliminary analyses showed that ownership 
concentration for single owners does not yield the same benefit. However, when the number of 
multiple owners reaches 5, firms benefit from concentrating ownership among them. They are 
likely better able to recognize who the significant partners are, whom they should be in 
communication with over the strategy and future of the firm, how to collectively exert 
managerial control, etc. The key issue here is that, while solving the free-rider problem is 
important, it is also crucial to have a group of owners to share knowledge and best practices 
with. Beyond the sharing of knowledge, it is also important to simply have a variety of sources to 
draw upon for the monitoring and stability we have discussed above.  
Finally, it is important to note that this effect has become more important over time. As 
China’s domestic stock exchanges have matured over a decade-and-a-half of operation, they 
have almost certainly become more competitive. Over time, firms within this field have become 
more efficient (as evidenced by the significant positive association between operating margins 
and the year trend variable), markets have opened up to more competitors (including foreign 
entrants), especially since 2001 and China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. As such, 
over time, ownership concentration has become more important than ever.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The hallmark of China’s economic reforms has been a gradual receding of the state from control 
over the economy. And, despite popular claims to the contrary, China’s economy has also been 
comparatively open to foreign capital (Lardy 2002; Guthrie 2006). These two facts together have 
created a situation in which multiple owners with very different agendas have come together as 
partners in ownership of many of China’s large-scale domestic firms. We find some evidence 
that state ownership (in the classic sense) has negative consequences for firm profitability; it 
certainly has negative consequences for firm efficiency. State ministries simply have different 
goals and agendas for the firms under their control than a private owner is likely to have. 
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Employment and social security is the most obvious issue here, but there are many other issues 
that have to do with China’s national economic strategies.  
In our analysis, we examined the relationship between firm performance and ownership 
concentration. Quietly, over the last decade of the stock exchange’s existence, ownership has 
been increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. However, it should be noted here that, 
while ownership concentration might intuitively like a negative factor in firm governance (at 
least in cases in which ultimate owners are the state), the concentration of ownership in the 
Chinese economy is not so different from that found in advanced industrialized capitalist 
economies like the United States15, and there is a growing mass of evidence that ownership 
concentration is positively correlated with firm performance in economies throughout the world. 
Many studies around the world have shown that ownership concentration has consistent and 
strong positive effects on profitability, and the case of China is no different. In our study, as 
ownership concentration increases, Chinese firms have higher levels of profits, higher levels of 
cash operating profits, and higher levels of operating margins. We have argued that ownership 
concentration is an issue of governance and control. It is the basic way in which multiple 
principals gain control over the firms in which they own significant stakes. The key issue for 
China is not whether firms have been privatized; rather, it is whether owners have the capacity to 
exert control over their firms. As we have seen in the earlier years of the economic reforms, 
operating control within the state sector at the township and municipal levels have had positive 
consequences for the performance of Chinese firms (Walder 1995a; Guthrie 1999, 2005). We 
believe a similar dynamic is at work here: regardless of whether they are state agencies or private 
backers, owners who have larger stakes in their firms have greater incentives to guide their firms 
in directions that will lead to profitability and performance in the economy. Groups of owners 
who have the tightest control over their firms as shareholders are able to guide their firms 
through this stage of the economic reforms. There is an important nuance here, however, in that 
ownership should not be too highly concentrated: as concentrated ownership is shared across a 
few owners, firms perform better than when ownership is in the hands of a single owner. Finally, 
the effect of ownership concentration has increased over time.  
                                                 
15 Our analysis of the interlocking ownership of Chinese SOEs has shown that the small-world statistics (Kogut and 
Walker 2001) of ownership of publicly-traded Chinese organizations are similar in magnitude to those found in the 
United States.  
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This paper has both practical and theoretical implications. From a practical perspective, 
the results are clear: Investors should stay away from firms that are still under the control of state 
ministries; they should look for firms that have higher levels of ownership concentration in the 
hands of 5 or more owners; they should look for the few firms that have the dominant owners 
that are private institutional investors; and SASAC firms might be worth watching for the future. 
If a private institutional investor seeks to influence firm performance, the best strategy is to 
become the dominant principal and exert control from that position. If that is not possible, 
however, pushing for ownership to become more concentrated among a handful of principals and 
then exerting control by aligning interests among the other key principals is the next best 
strategy.  
On a theoretical level, we interpret our findings as fitting squarely with the research on 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, with a few 
modifications. In emerging economies, firms need stability; they need the monitoring to 
overcome corruption; and they need the attention of interested owners to help guide as they learn 
the rules of the new capitalist system. In reform-era China, ownership concentration—whether 
owners are the Chinese state, SASAC, or private owners (domestic or abroad)—turns out to be 
one of the most important factors for success, especially as markets become more competitive. 
When multiple owners come together to shape the direction of the firm, they most effectively 
influence the firm by concentrating ownership and aligning their interests with a few other key 
owners. Few studies have placed the reality of corporate ownership in the framework of multiple 
principals. Our study attempts to acknowledge the changing dynamic of corporate ownership in 
today’s global economy and link this back to the common mechanism by which owners have 
long dealt with issues of ownership and managerial control—ownership concentration. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Definitions  
 
Variables 
 
Means 
Standard 
Deviations 
 
Definitions 
Net Profit1 
 
67,400,000 
 
391,000,000 
 
Net profit=gross profit minus indirect costs (i.e., costs not directly 
attributable to production that were already removed from sales 
revenues to arrive at the gross profit figure). 
 
Profits (EBIT)1 
 
 
119,000,000 
 
664,000,000 
 
 
“EBIT” (Cash operating profit)=earnings before deducting interest, 
taxes, depreciation, amortization, and other non-operating items. 
 
Operating 
margins 
 
.20 
 
.23 
 
Profits divided by sales. 
 
Trading city 
 
.45 
 
.50 
 
Dummy variable, Shenzhen (1 = yes) 
 
Debt to asset 
ratio 
 
.49 
 
 
.44 
 
 
Debt divided by assets. 
 
 
Sales(ln) 19.98 1.27 Natural log of gross sales. 
 
Mult. owners 
(>5% shares) 
 
.52 
 
 
.27 
 
 
Multiple owners with more than 5% holdings (1 = yes). 
 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
41.39 
 
13.89 
 
Percentage of shares controlled by the ten largest shareholders. 
 
State dominant 
 
.405 
 
.49 
 
Dummy variable, state shares largest (1 = yes). 
 
SASAC dom. 
 
.49 
 
.50 
 
Dummy variable, state institutional shares largest (1 = yes). 
 
Private dominant 
 
.038 
 
.19 
 
Dummy variable, private institutional shares largest (1 = yes). 
 
State shares (%) 
 
23.19 
(35.67) 
15.30 
 
Percentage of “state shares” [guojiagu] (Figure 1, category 1) 
owned by state offices (ministries and bureaus). 
 
SASAC (%) 
 
 
13.49 
(44.70) 
16.70 
 
Percentage of “state institutional shares” [guoyou farengu] (Figure 
1, category 2Aa) owned by SASAC. 
Private shares 
(%) 
 
21.08 
(33.06) 
 
2.91 
 
 
Percentage of shares owned by private institutional investors 
(Figure 1, category 2B+2C). 
 
Interaction term 414.39 178.96 Time trend multiplied by ownership concentration. 
 
Time trend 
 
6.77 2.51 Year trend. 
Ag./mining .03 .17 Dummy variable, Agriculture/ mining (1=yes). 
 
Energy/const. .06 .23 Dummy variable, Energy/ construction (1=yes). 
 
Services 
 
.28 .45 Dummy variable, Services (1=yes). 
Others .08 .27 Dummy variable, Others (1=yes). 
1 RMB      
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Table 2: Random and Fixed Effects Models Predicting the Determinants of Net Profitability for Chinese Publicly-Traded Firms,  
1994-2003a 
 
 I 
(R.E.) 
II 
(R.E.) 
III 
(R.E.) 
IV 
(R.E.) 
V 
(R.E.) 
VI 
(R.E.) 
VII 
(F.E.) 
VIII 
(F.E.) 
Lag Net profits 
 
 
--- 
 
.00*** 
(.00) 
 
--- 
 
--- .00*** 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
Shenzhen 
  
-37.90 
(24.40) 
 
2.32 
(3.95) 
-40.90* 
(24.40) 
-39.30 
(24.40) 
1.44 
(3.90) 
2.12 
(3.90) 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
Sales(ln) 
  
57.70*** 
(2.75) 
10.20*** 
(1.67) 
57.60*** 
(2.77) 
57.80*** 
(2.77) 
9.26*** 
(1.67) 
9.36*** 
(1.67) 
39.20*** 
(3.36) 
39.40*** 
(3.36) 
 
Debts/ assets 
 
-55.70*** 
(4.60) 
-5.00 
(4.47) 
-57.80*** 
(4.61) 
-56.50*** 
(4.62) 
-6.17 
(4.43) 
-4.99 
(4.43) 
-43.00*** 
(5.04) 
-41.70*** 
(5.05) 
 
Owner concentration 
 
1.09*** 
(.25) 
.45*** 
(.15) 
1.13*** 
(.26) 
.02 
(.35) 
.50*** 
(.16) 
-1.10*** 
(.38) 
1.37*** 
(.32) 
.07 
(.45) 
 
Mult. owners (>5%) 
 
13.00** 
(6.56) 
.16 
(4.03) 
9.25 
(6.98) 
10.00 
(6.98) 
1.15 
(4.39) 
1.10 
(4.38) 
12.60 
(8.12) 
12.90 
(8.11) 
 
SASAC dummy 
 
 
15.20* 
(8.32) 
 
-1.18 
(4.08) 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
Private dummy 
 
 
16.40* 
(8.70) 
 
13.90* 
(8.24) 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
State shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
-.04 
(.44) 
-.10 
(.44) 
.02 
(.17) 
.00 
(.17) 
-.57 
(.66) 
-.61 
(.66) 
 
SASAC shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.14 
(.42) 
.08 
(.42) 
-.10 
(.16) 
-.14 
(.16) 
.00 
(.64) 
.01 
(.64) 
 
Private shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.30 
(.88) 
-.43 
(.89) 
.77 
(.68) 
.47 
(.68) 
.90 
(1.26) 
-.14 
(1.29) 
 
Sector cont. 
Ag./mining 
  
  
 
316.00*** 
(63.00) 
 
 
12.80 
(11.50) 
323.00*** 
(63.60) 
321.00*** 
(63.50) 
11.50 
(11.40) 
10.70 
(11.40) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
Energy/const. 
 
125.00** 
(52.00) 
15.80* 
(8.72) 
123.00** 
(52.10) 
123.00** 
(52.00) 
15.80* 
(8.58) 
16.10* 
(8.57) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Services  
  
25.40 
(28.00) 
-3.13 
(4.58) 
26.70 
(28.00) 
26.60 
(28.00) 
-.79 
(4.51) 
-1.38 
(4.51) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Others  
  
14.90 
(52.00) 
4.11 
(7.81) 
17.80 
(51.50) 
19.30 
(51.40) 
5.06 
(7.72) 
4.55 
(7.71) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Time controls 
Yr. trend 
  
-5.34*** 
(1.16) 
4.77*** 
(1.31) 
-5.45*** 
(1.18) 
-18.20*** 
(3.05) 
4.88*** 
(1.30) 
-10.20*** 
(3.49) 
1.07 
(1.33) 
-15.10*** 
(3.60) 
 
Interaction 
 
  
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.21*** 
(.05) 
 
--- 
 
.25*** 
(.05) 
 
--- .23*** 
(.06) 
 
Yr controls 
 
  
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Constant 
  
-1080*** 
(61.70) 
-250*** 
(35.80) 
-1070*** 
(62.20) 
-1010*** 
(63.50) 
-283*** 
(45.10) 
-138*** 
(41.50) 
-777*** 
(71.30) 
-703*** 
(73.40) 
N  9,101 7,630 8,904 8,904 7,446 7,446 7,446 7,446 
R2  .10 .81 .10 .11 .82 .83 .67 .78 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (one-tailed tests) 
a Coefficients dividend by 1,000,000. 
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Table 3: Random and Fixed Effects Models Predicting the Determinants of EBIT Profitability for Chinese Publicly-Traded Firms,  
1994-2003a 
 
 I 
(R.E.) 
II 
(R.E.) 
III 
(R.E.) 
IV 
(R.E.) 
V 
(R.E.) 
VI 
(R.E.) 
VII 
(F.E.) 
VIII 
(F.E.) 
 
Lag EBIT profits 
 
 
--- 
 
.00*** 
(.00) 
 
--- 
 
--- .00*** 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
.00*** 
(.00) 
Shenzhen 
  
-59.60 
(44.0)) 
2.17 
(4.89) 
-64.60 
(44.0) 
-62.90 
(43.90) 
1.18 
(4.91) 
2.04 
(4.91) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Sales(ln) 
  
79.70*** 
(3.42) 
12.90*** 
(2.05) 
79.10*** 
(3.46) 
79.40*** 
(3.46) 
12.50*** 
(2.10) 
12.50*** 
(2.09) 
58.30*** 
(4.15) 
58.50*** 
(4.14) 
 
Debts/ assets 
 
-49.70*** 
(5.63) 
-2.15 
(5.48) 
-51.50*** 
(5.67) 
-50.10*** 
(5.68) 
-3.80 
(5.50) 
-2.33 
(5.50) 
-38.40*** 
(6.16) 
-36.90*** 
(6.17) 
 
Owner concentration 
 
1.07*** 
(.30) 
.40** 
(.18) 
1.08*** 
(.32) 
-.08 
(.44) 
.47** 
(.20) 
-1.47*** 
(.47) 
1.24*** 
(.39) 
-.17 
(.55) 
 
Mult. owners (>5%) 
 
13.10 
(8.14) 
1.01 
(4.99) 
9.41 
(8.69) 
         10.00 
           (8.69) 
            .22 
           (5.52) 
      .31 
       (5.50) 
    13.00 
    (10.00) 
13.30 
(10.10) 
 
SASAC dummy 
 
 
10.80 
(10.40) 
 
-1.88 
(5.05) 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
Private dummy 
 
 
12.70 
(10.70) 
18.40* 
(10.10) 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
State shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.08 
(.54) 
.03 
(.54) 
.01 
(.20) 
-.02 
(.22) 
-.57 
(.66) 
-.61 
(.66) 
 
SASAC shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.33 
(.53) 
.30 
(.53) 
-.12 
(.21) 
-.17 
(.21) 
.00 
(.64) 
.01 
(.64) 
 
Private shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.11 
(1.09) 
-.69 
(1.11) 
.97 
(.85) 
.59 
(.85) 
.90 
(1.26) 
-.14 
(1.29) 
 
Sector cont. 
Ag./mining  
  
548.00*** 
(113.00) 
7.40 
(14.20) 
561.00*** 
(114.0) 
559.00*** 
(114.00) 
7.30 
(14.30) 
6.296 
(14.20) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Energy/const. 
 
181.00* 
(93.60) 
23.20 
(20.80) 
179.00 
(93.70) 
180.00 
(93.50) 
24.00** 
(10.80) 
24.30** 
(10.80) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Services 
   
36.20 
(50.60) 
-2.17 
(5.68) 
37.80 
(50.60) 
38.50 
(50.50) 
.11 
(5.70) 
-.677 
(5.679) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Others 
   
15.80 
(92.40) 
6.06 
(9.61) 
18.10 
(92.70) 
20.90 
(92.50) 
7.50 
(9.74) 
6.861 
(9.698) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Time controls 
Yr. trend 
  
-1.63 
(1.41) 
3.97** 
(1.60) 
-1.83 
(1.46) 
-15.40*** 
(3.76) 
3.99*** 
(1.60) 
-14.20*** 
(4.33) 
.28 
(1.63) 
-15.10*** 
(4.44) 
 
Interaction 
 
  
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
 
--- 
 
.23*** 
(.06) 
 
--- .30*** 
(.07) 
 
--- .25*** 
(.07) 
 
Yr controls 
 
  
Included 
 
       Included 
 
       Included
 
       Included
 
       Included
 
       Included 
 
     Included 
 
   Included 
Constant 
  
-1500*** 
(80.60) 
-288*** 
(44.20) 
-1480*** 
(81.60) 
-1410*** 
(82.90) 
-283*** 
(45.00) 
-164** 
(52.00) 
-1120*** 
(87.80) 
-1030*** 
(90.40) 
N  9,089 7,432 8,893 8,893 7,432 7,432 7,432 7,432 
R2  .08 .90 .08 .09 .91 .91 .78 .78 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (one-tailed tests) 
a Coefficients dividend by 1,000,000. 
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Table 4: Random and Fixed Effects Models Predicting the Determinants of 
Operating Margins for Chinese Publicly-Traded Firms,  
1994-2003 
 I 
(R.E.)  
II 
(F.E.) 
 
Lag op. margins 
 
 
.54*** 
(.01)  
.21*** 
(.01) 
Shenzhen 
 
.003 
(.004) 
  
--- 
 
 
Sales(ln) 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
.02*** 
(.004) 
 
Debts/ assets 
 
-.03*** 
(.005) 
  
-.01*** 
(.006) 
 
Owner concentration 
 
 
.003* 
(.000) 
 
  
.002*** 
(.000) 
 
Mult. owners (>5%) 
 
 
 
.001 
(.004) 
 
  
.015 
(.009) 
 
SASAC dummy 
 
 
.008* 
(.004) 
  
--- 
 
 
Private dummy 
 
 
.02* 
(.01) 
  
--- 
 
 
State shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
  
-.001** 
(.001) 
 
SASAC shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
  
-.001 
(.001) 
 
Private shares (%) 
 
 
--- 
 
  
.000 
(.001) 
Sector cont. 
Ag./mining  
 
.006*** 
(.01) 
  
--- 
 
Energy/const. 
 
.19** 
(.09) 
  
--- 
 
Services  
 
.02*** 
(.005) 
  
--- 
 
Others  
 
.001 
(.008) 
  
--- 
 
Time controls 
Yr. trend 
 
.01*** 
(.001) 
  
 
.01*** 
(.002) 
 
Yr. controls 
 
 
Included 
  
Included 
Constant 
 
.02 
(.04) 
  
-.37*** 
(.08) 
 
N 7,626  7,442 
R2 .37  .26 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 (one-tailed tests) 
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Figure 1: Ownership of Publicly-Traded Firms
1. State Shares
a. State
b. Non-state
a. Domestic
b. Foreign
a. Founder
b. Private Group Shares
c. Public Group Shares
2. Institutional Shares 
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3. Free Floating Shares
Group
Co.
[jituan gongsi]
Group
Co.
Ltd.
Shares Co.
(IPO)
Group
Co.
State Office 
[zhuguan bumen]
State
(1)
FF
(3)
Inst.
(2)
IPO Process Ownership Categories after IPO
Organizational changes
Ownership  
 
 
 
  -43-
 
 
  -44-
 
 
*Calculated based on full model (VI), all other variables constrained at the means 
 
 
 
